

Verifying Security Protocols in Tamarin

Exercise Sheet 1

Assignment 1.1: Practical Tool Usage: Tutorial

Look at Tutorial.spthy which is part of the Tamarin distribution (<https://github.com/tamarin-prover/tamarin-prover/blob/develop/examples/Tutorial.spthy>), and work through the file to understand how this specification works.

Assignment 1.2: Applying Formal Methods

In this exercise, assume you've been hired to do some consulting work applying formal methods. The Swiss government wants you to evaluate their new software which is designed to make referenda (*Volksabstimmungen*) automated and online. Their contractors, Spitzenprotokoll AG, have designed the following protocol:

1. $A \rightarrow S : A$
2. $S \rightarrow A : \{Q, N_S\}_{\text{pk}(A)}$
3. $A \rightarrow S : \{Ans_Q, N_S\}_{\text{pk}(S)}$

where A is a voter, S is a fixed voting server, N_S is a nonce sent by the server to ensure freshness, Q is a referendum question, and Ans_Q is A 's answer to that question. Assume S and A share their respective public keys in advance.

Your job is to compare this protocol with the existing, physical voting method, which we assume is secure. We make the standard Dolev-Yao assumptions presented in the lecture.

- (a) Does this protocol provide anonymity? Can an attacker tell who has voted?
- (b) Does it provide confidentiality? Can an attacker find out, for a given A , how he or she voted?
- (c) Does the protocol provide authentication? Can S be sure that the answer came from A ?
- (d) Can each voter vote at most once?
- (e) Is availability guaranteed? Can A be sure that she can vote if she wants to?
- (f) Is integrity provided? Does S know that a given answer hasn't been modified.

Assignment 1.3: Attack-Preserving Assumptions

In protocol analysis, making assumptions or abstracting certain things away can be very helpful. Some assumptions, however, can exclude attacks at analysis time. We call these assumptions *non-attack-preserving*. Using non-attack-preserving assumptions is a tradeoff.

- (a) What are some arguments for and against the use of non-attack-preserving assumptions or abstractions?
- (b) In the lecture, we have made the assumption that when A and B receive messages, they “know” what protocol they belong to.

Do you think this assumption is reasonable? Do you think it is attack-preserving?

- (c) What common mechanisms do we use in practice to try to realize this assumption?

Hint: On a Linux system, check out the file `/etc/services`.

Assignment 1.4: Diffie-Hellman

In Day 1, we have built key-establishment protocols using an honest key-server S who has a shared key $k(A, S)$ with every agent A .

- (a) Combine this schema with the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange, using the key-server to authenticate the exchange.

Hint: Use the structure of the protocol on slide 33 (“Fifth and Final Attempt”) of Day 1.

- (b) Argue why your Diffie-Hellman based protocol offers stronger security than the key-exchange protocols of Day 1 in a situation, where the intruder is able to compromise the honest key server at some point in time and find out all long-term keys $k(A, S)$.